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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that rapid vocal repetition of a one-word version of negative 
self-referential thought reduces the stimulus functions (e.g., emotional discomfort and 
believability) associated with that thought. The present study compares the effects of that 
defusion strategy with thought distraction and distraction-based experimental control 
tasks on a negative self-referential thought. Non-clinical undergraduates were randomly 
assigned to one of three protocols. The cognitive defusion condition reduced the 
emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts significantly 
greater than comparison conditions. Favorable results were also found for the defusion 
technique with participants with elevated depressive symptoms.  
Key Words: acceptance; Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; believability; cognitive 
defusion; emotional discomfort; mindfulness; self-referential thoughts; thought 
distraction 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, acceptance- and mindfulness-based interventions (see Hayes, 
Follette, & Linehan, 2004) have been widely discussed and studied in the field of 
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT). As a group, these therapies generally focus more on 
the functional effects of private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings, physiological sensations, 
memories) than on content and frequency of these events in understanding and treating 
psychopathology (e.g., Fisher & Wells, 2005; Linehan, 1993; Segal, Teasdale, & 
Williams, 2004). An example of these interventions is Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).  
ACT includes various techniques to change the function of private events in order 
to promote psychological health (e.g., Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
One set of techniques used particularly for this purpose are cognitive defusion strategies 
(see Luoma & Hayes, 2009). Cognitive defusion is roughly conceptualized as altering the 
literal meaning and behavior-regulatory function of private events without necessarily 
altering the form, frequency, or situational sensitivity of these events (Blackledge, 2007). 
In ACT, defusion techniques are often employed in contexts where clients are 
excessively entangled or fused with their private events, such as negative self-referential 
thought (e.g., “I am depressed”; “I” = “depression”).  
Control-based strategies, such as avoidance, thought suppression, and distraction 
are conventional coping methods for unwanted private events (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Research has shown that these strategies, which directly 
target the form and frequency of unwanted private events, may be ineffective and 
potentially paradoxical (e.g., Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, & 
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Fink, 2004). Among these, the iatrogenic effect is especially clear in the case of 
suppression methods (e.g., Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; Levitt, Brown, 
Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Marcks & Woods, 2007). For example, in a study by Marcks 
and Woods, 2005 participants instructed to suppress their personally relevant intrusive 
thoughts were found to report difficulty in doing so and increased distress after 
suppression attempt. For this reason, ACT aims at strengthening the process of cognitive 
defusion for difficult private events, instead of employing control-based coping strategies.  
Several focused studies have investigated the effects of specific cognitive 
defusion techniques on negative self-referential thoughts (e.g., Healy et al., 2008; 
Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 2009). One study investigated 
the effects of a commonly used cognitive defusion technique, “I am having a thought 
that…” (Healy et al., 2008). The study suggests that negative self-referential statements 
(e.g., “my life is pointless”) when presented in the defused format (e.g., “I am having a 
thought that my life is pointless”) can decrease the emotional discomfort associated with 
that statement and increase willingness to be exposed to these statements. 
Another study examined the effects of rapid vocal repetition of a one-word 
version of a negative self-referential thought—another commonly used defusion 
technique (Masuda et al., 2004). This technique is derived from the observation that when 
a word is rapidly repeated out loud, the context required for the word to have its literal 
meaning is altered, and the literal meaning of the word disappears (Titchener, 1910). In 
the study, the defusion protocol consisted of a defusion rationale, training, and 30-second 
rapid vocal repetition of a one-word version of the negative self-referential thought. The 
defusion condition was compared to a distraction-based experimental control task 
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(reading an article on Japan) and thought control task. Primary dependent variables were 
reductions in emotional discomfort and believability of the self-referential negative 
thoughts. Results revealed that the defusion condition decreased the stimulus functions 
(i.e., emotional discomfort and believability) associated with these thoughts more so than 
comparison conditions across all participants.  
A subsequent group parametric study examined whether the duration of one-word 
thought repetition systematically altered the impact of this defusion strategy (Masuda et 
al., 2009). The reduction of emotional discomfort was found to bottom out after 3 to 10 
seconds of rapid repetition, whereas the maximum reduction of believability occurred 
after 20 to 30 seconds of repetition. These findings additionally suggest that the actual 
experiential exercise of rapid thought repetition is crucial for altering the stimulus 
function of negative self-referential thoughts, and that emotional discomfort and 
believability may be distinctive functional aspects of cognitive events.   
While interesting and encouraging, previous studies did not clearly reveal the 
relative effects of rapid thought repetition. Although the original defusion study (Masuda 
et al., 2004) reported the superiority of the defusion condition to comparison conditions, 
multiple treatment interference likely occurred because each participant in the study 
received multiple interventions. Additionally, the thought-control condition in the study 
was employed for controlling gross demand characteristics. The subsequent parametric 
study (Masuda et al., 2009) did not compare the defusion protocol with an active 
comparison condition, either. 
Additionally, the effects of this cognitive defusion technique have not been 
examined in clinical or sub-clinical samples. To date, there are several focused 
Cognitive Defusion     6  
 
experimental studies reporting the positive effects of an acceptance-based emotion 
regulation strategy in clinical samples with emotional disorders (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, 
Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). These results are 
relevant to the present study in part because the acceptance-based strategy shares aims 
with defusion strategies (i.e., changes in the stimulus function of aversive private events). 
Given the lack of empirical evidence, it is worthwhile to investigate the effects of 
defusion using a subgroup from a non-clinical sample, such as non-clinical college 
undergraduates who report elevated psychological symptoms.    
As a response to these emerging questions, the present study investigates the 
relative impact of the cognitive defusion technique (i.e., rapid thought repetition) on a 
self-referential negative thought, as compared to a thought distraction strategy. The 
present study had several methodological and conceptual advantages over previous 
defusion studies (Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2009). The study employed a group 
design format in order to reduce extraneous variables, such as multiple treatment 
interference, and it more clearly identified the active comparison condition. The thought 
distraction strategy, which is roughly defined as an effort of selectively attending to an 
emotionally less distressing event or situation (Gross, 1998), was selected as the active 
comparison condition for several reasons. First, a distraction technique is a defined 
control strategy (e.g., McCaul & Malott, 1984) that appears theoretically distinct from 
cognitive defusion because of its primary focus on reducing the frequency of an 
unwanted private event by shifting attention away from it. Second, distraction can be an 
appropriate active comparison condition because it has been found effective in some 
contexts, especially in the situations of mildly and moderately aversive events (e.g., 
Cognitive Defusion     7  
 
Gutiérrez et al., 2004). Finally, the distraction-based experimental control condition (e.g., 
reading an article about Japan) was also added to the study as a control group in order to 
control non-specific factors. Based on previous research findings (e.g., Gutiérrez et al. 
Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2009), it was hypothesized that the cognitive defusion 
condition would reduce the emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-
referential thoughts greater than the comparison conditions. It was further predicted that 
positive effects of cognitive defusion also would be seen among participants who 
reported “elevated depressive symptoms.”         
2. Method 
2.1. Participants and Settings 
The study was conducted at a large public 4-year university in Georgia. 
Participants were 132 students (77%, nFemale = 102) recruited from undergraduate 
psychology courses through a web-based research participant pool. The age of the 
participants ranged from 17-60 years (M = 20.91, SD = 6.96). The ethnic composition of 
the sample was diverse with 39% (n = 50) identifying as “European American,” 33% (n = 
43) identifying as “African American,” 14% (n = 19) identifying as “Asian 
American/Pacific Islander American,” 9% (n = 11) identifying as “Hispanic American,” 
and 5% (n = 7) identifying as “other” or “bicultural.”  
2.2. Demographic and Screening Form 
Following the consent procedure, participants completed a demographic form and 
the BDI-II. The demographic variables included gender, age, and ethnicity. 
2.2.1. Beck Depression Inventory II. 
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The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is often 
used as a screening form for general psychological functioning. The measure appeared to 
be particularly relevant because of the link between negative self-referential thoughts (the 
dependent variables of the study) and depression (the event measured by the BDI-II). The 
BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire that is designed to assess recent depressive 
symptoms. Each item is rated using a 4-point severity scale, ranging from 0 to 3. The 
total score ranges from 0 to 63 with greater scores suggesting greater depressive 
symptoms. The BDI-II has shown good test-retest reliability (r = .93) and has 
demonstrated a high correlation with the original BDI (r = .93, Beck et al, 1996). In the 
present study, the mean BDI-II score was used as the cutoff for selecting a sub-sample of 
participants with elevated depressive symptoms.  
2.3. Thought Selection and Assessment 
Following completion of the demographic form and the BDI-II, thought selection 
and assessment was conducted. Thought selection and assessment were administered by 
research investigators who were trained by the first author. The procedure and instruction 
of the thought selection and procedure was closely scripted. The participant was given an 
assessment form and orally instructed to generate one negative self-referential thought 
that had entered the participant’s mind repeatedly and regularly and that had been found 
particularly disturbing and believable (e.g., “I am not pretty”). Participants were then 
asked to restate the thought in one word (e.g., “ugly”). The degree of emotional 
discomfort and the believability of the thought were assessed using a 100-mm Likert-
style visual analog scale before and immediately after the intervention. Responses ranged 
from 0 (not at all uncomfortable) to 100 (very uncomfortable) for the discomfort scale, 
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and from 0 (not at all believable) to 100 (very believable) for the believability scale. If 
participants could not come up with a thought that was above 50 on the discomfort or 50 
on believability scales, they were prompted to identify another negative self-referential 
thought that was more uncomfortable and believable. Participants, who could not come 
up with a thought that was above 50 on the discomfort or 50 on believability scales after 
the prompt, were eliminated in order to fit participants to the purpose of the present 
investigation. Participants were not informed of the inclusion criteria. 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (a) cognitive 
defusion, (b) thought distraction, and (c) distraction-based experimental control (control) 
tasks. All of these intervention conditions were 5 minutes long and closely scripted. 
Investigators ran participants in all conditions to minimize experimenter effects. 
Experimenters were trained by the first author who is a licensed clinical psychologist and 
has extensive research experience. A weekly research meeting was held to ensure 
adherence to the scripted intervention.  
Both active interventions were equal in (a) components, (b) duration (5-minutes), 
(c) sequence of components, (d) contents of training (e.g., the use of the word “milk” 
highlighting the use of the assigned strategy), and (e) the number of prompts given during 
the intervention phase. A distraction-based experimental control condition was added to 
the current work to control non-specific factors, such as the duration of the contact with 
the experimenter.    
2.4.1. Cognitive Defusion Condition.  
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The cognitive defusion task consisted of the defusion rationale, defusion training, 
and a 30-second rapid vocal repetition of the one-word target thought. The rationale and 
training were drawn from the original ACT book (Hayes et al., 1999). The defusion 
rationale identified the positive aspects of human verbal behavior (e.g., thinking, 
language), but also addressed the role of language and thinking in human suffering. The 
participant was told that a distressing self-referential thought may be relatively automatic 
and that people often identify themselves with the literal content of their thoughts. To 
exemplify this, defusion training was introduced where the participant was initially asked 
to say the word "milk" once and to notice all of its perceptual functions (e.g., “white,” 
“cold,” “creamy”). The participant was then instructed to repeat the word "milk" out loud 
as rapidly as possible for 20 seconds. The participant was told to notice what happens to 
the perceptual functions during the word repetition. Participants typically reported that 
the meaning of the word began to disappear, and most participants noted that more direct 
functions appeared (e.g., “The word milk did not mean anything.” “It became just a 
sound.”). The experimenter then suggested that this defusion experience could be 
applicable to the participant’s self-referential negative thought, indicating that negative 
thoughts are also simply sounds with conventional meanings. The participant was then 
asked to repeatedly state the one-word self-referential negative thought (e.g., “fat”) aloud 
as fast as possible until informed to stop. The experimenter said, "stop" after 30 seconds 
passed. As in Masuda et al. (2004), to maintain engagement in this condition, the 
experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., "faster" and "louder") to the participant after 
10 and 20 seconds.  
2.4.2. Thought Distraction Condition.  
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The thought distraction condition consisted of a thought distraction rationale, 
distraction training, and the actual attempt at distracting from the target negative self-
referential thought. The thought distraction condition began with a statement suggesting 
that cognitions cause and trigger actions and emotions, and that negative thoughts are the 
source of human suffering, followed by a statement suggesting that distracting oneself 
from negative thoughts by thinking of something different is a solution. After the brief 
rationale, the participant received thought distraction training using the word, “milk.” 
Similar to the defusion condition, the participant was asked to say the word "milk" once 
and to notice all of its perceptual functions (e.g., “white,” “cold,” “creamy”). Then, the 
participant was instructed not to think of the word “milk” by thinking of something 
emotionally neutral or less unpleasant for about 20 seconds. After briefly discussing the 
usefulness and credibility of the distraction strategy on the word “milk,” the experimenter 
then suggests applying this experience to his or her negative self-referential thought in 
order to prevent psychological suffering. Prior to the actual use of the thought distraction 
strategy on the target thought, the participant was first asked to say the one-word version 
of that thought once to focus on the target thought. The participant was then instructed to 
distract from the target negative self-referential thought by thinking of something else 
until the experimenter said “stop.” As in the defusion condition, in order to maintain 
engagement in this condition, the experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., "don’t 
think about it") to the participant after 10 and 20 seconds. The experimenter said "stop" 
after 30 seconds passed.  
Because of the potentially greater variation of actual distraction strategies and the 
quality of such attempts relative to the cognitive defusion condition, a brief experimental 
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manipulation check was conducted for the thought distraction group at post-experiment. 
Participants were asked what they had tried to think about during distraction, and how 
successful they were at it  using a 3- point scale, ranging from 0 (not being able to do so 
at all), 1 (somewhat being able to do so), to 2 (being able to do so well). Examples of the 
distracting thought contents included upcoming pleasant events (e.g., Thanksgiving, a 
friend’s birthday), something neutral, such as thinking about the next scheduled 
appointment, and stimuli in the experimental room, such as the door or window. Even 
though the content varied, the attempts fit the conceptualization of thought distraction as 
an effort of selectively attending to an emotionally less distressing event or situation 
(Gross, 1998). The average rating was 1.35 (SD = .66), falling in the range between 
somewhat able and very well able to distract themselves from the target thoughts.     
2.4.3. Distraction-based Experimental Control Condition.  
The experimental control condition (control condition) did not include a rationale. 
The condition involved reading an emotionally neutral article about Japan (i.e., vacations 
to the mountains) for 5 minutes.  
3. Results 
3.1. Characteristics of Sample 
The mean score for the 132 participants on the BDI-II, which was used to assess 
participants’ general psychological functioning at pre, was 9.09 (SD = 7.64). The score 
fell in the average range of a non-clinical population. Of the 132 participants who were 
randomly assigned to the cognitive defusion (n = 41), thought distraction (n = 48), or 
control condition (n = 43), 15 participants (defusion = 5, thought distraction = 6, & 
control = 4) were excluded due to extraneous methodological factors. Specifically, 13 of 
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these participants were excluded because of difficulty in identifying a negative self-
referential thought or inability to follow instructions. Two participants (one from each 
active condition) discontinued their participation prior to the completion of assessment 
because they expressed elevated levels of frustration and became argumentative toward 
the experimenter. Furthermore, an additional 14 participants (defusion = 5, thought 
distraction = 4, & distraction-based experimental control = 5) were excluded at the time 
of data analyses because of the inclusion criteria (i.e., 50 or greater in both emotional 
discomfort and believability at pre-intervention). Results were equivalent when the data 
of the 14 participants were included in the following data analyses.   
As a result, 103 participants with relatively high degrees of emotional discomfort 
and believability were left for data analyses; cognitive defusion (n = 31), thought 
distraction (n = 38), and distraction-based experimental control condition (n = 34). Of 
those, 76% were females (n = 78). The age of the participants ranged from 17-60 years 
(M = 21.17, SD = 7.72). The final sample was ethnically diverse with 38% (n = 39) 
identifying as “European American,” 30% (n = 31) identifying as “African American,” 
17% (n = 17) identifying as “Asian/Pacific Islander,” 11% (n = 11) identifying as 
“Hispanic American,” and 4% (n = 4) identifying as “other” or “bicultural.”  
3.2. Pre-intervention Group Differences & the Effects of Potential Confounding Factors 
Chi-square testes and ANOVAs revealed that the groups did not differ in the 
compositions of gender and ethnicity background. BDI-II score, the age of participants, 
and pre-intervention emotional discomfort and believability (p > .10), did not differ 
significantly by group. Furthermore, results of two 4 (i.e., experimenters) by 2 (i.e., time) 
repeated measures ANOVAs revealed no main effect of experimenter or interaction of 
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time and experimenter in the emotional discomfort or believability of negative self-
referential thoughts, Fs < 1.17, ps > .32.     
3.3. Effects on Self-Referential Negative Thoughts 
The means, standard deviations, and effect sizes of emotional discomfort and 
believability scores for all conditions are presented in Table 1. The results for the 
emotional discomfort and believability of the negative self-referential thoughts were 
analyzed separately, using two 3 (condition: cognitive defusion, thought distraction, & 
control condition) by 2 (time: pre- and post-intervention) repeated measure ANOVAs.   
3.3.1. Emotional Discomfort.  
Results showed a main effect for time, F(1, 100) = 129.16, p < .001, and a two way 
interaction between condition and time, F(2, 100) = 5.15, p < .01 (see Figure 1). The 
interaction was decomposed both by looking at the effects of time across each condition 
and by looking at the effects of condition at each time point. Emotional discomfort at 
post-intervention was found to be significantly lower than pre-intervention emotional 
discomfort across all conditions (F’s > 15, ps < .001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
at post, the defusion group reported significantly lower levels of emotional discomfort 
than the thought distraction group (p < .05) and distraction-based experimental control 
group (p < .001). The thought distraction group reported significantly lower emotional 
discomfort than the experimental control group (p < .05).   
3.3.2. Believability.  
Almost identical results were found in the believability of the negative self-
referential thoughts with one exception. In the believability of negative self-referential 
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thought, no group difference between thought distraction and experimental control 
groups were found at post-intervention (p > .05).   
3.4. Effects on Individuals with Elevated Depressive Symptoms 
 The mean score of BDI-II in 103 participants was 9.9 (SD = 8.18). As a result, 
using the BDI-cut off score of 10, 42 participants were selected as participants with 
elevated depressive symptoms; cognitive defusion (n = 14), thought distraction (n = 10), 
and distraction experimental control condition (n = 18). An ANOVA revealed that BDI-II 
score did not significantly differ by group (p > .19). 
3.4.1. Emotional Discomfort. 
 The means, standard deviations, and effect sizes of emotional discomfort and 
believability scores for all conditions among those with elevated depressive symptoms 
are presented in Table 2. Given a significant group difference of emotional discomfort at 
pre-intervention, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on post-intervention emotional 
discomfort, covarying the pre-treatment levels of emotional discomfort was performed. 
Results revealed the main effect of condition, F(2, 38) = 4.73, p < .05. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the cognitive defusion group had significantly lower emotional 
discomfort than the experimental control condition (p < .01) Pairwise comparisons did 
not reveal other significant group differences. 
3.4.2. Believability.  
A 3 (condition: cognitive defusion, thought distraction, & control condition) by 2 
(time: pre- and post-intervention) repeated measure ANOVA revealed the main effect for 
time, F(1, 100) = 129.16, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant reduction 
of believability at post-treatment as compared to pre-treatment (p < .001). The time by 
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condition interaction effect was not found to be significant, F(2, 39) = 2.57, p = .089. 
However, at post-intervention, a medium effect size (d = -.65) was found in the 
comparison between cognitive defusion and thought distraction conditions, and a large 
effect size (d = -.99) was found in the comparison between cognitive defusion and 
experimental control conditions. Both of these results favored the cognitive defusion 
condition.      
3.5. Exploratory Analyses on the Role of Depressive Symptoms 
 Because similar patterns were found between the overall participant group and the 
subgroup with elevated depressive symptoms, the roles of depressive symptom (i.e., BDI-
II scores) on negative self-referential thoughts and the effects of intervention were further 
investigated. A correlational analysis, using the overall sample of 103 participants, 
revealed that the depressive symptom (BDI scores) was not a predictor of emotional 
discomfort (r =.06, p = .53) or believability (r =.08, p = .44) at post-intervention. 
Subsequently, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted separately for each post-
intervention outcome to investigate depressive symptom as a moderator of the relations 
between intervention and that outcome variable. In the analysis, the variable of interest at 
pre-intervention was entered into the first step, followed by depressive symptom in the 
second step. Subsequently, intervention condition (i.e., categorized as 1 = defusion, 2 = 
thought distraction, & 3 = control condition) was entered in the third step. Finally, 
depressive symptom and the interaction term were entered in the third step. Results 
revealed that depressive symptom was not found to be a moderator of the relations 
between intervention and post-intervention emotional discomfort (β =-.02, t = -.08, p 
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= .93) or between intervention and post-intervention believability (β =-.16, t = -.70, p 
= .49).    
4. Discussion 
Consistent with previous cognitive defusion studies (Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda 
et al., 2009), the present study suggests that the rapid repetition of a one-word version of 
a self-referential negative thought, combined with a clinical rationale and training, 
reduces the emotional discomfort and believability of that thought at least temporarily. 
The present investigation is the first to show the superior effects of the defusion 
procedure over a thought distraction strategy, a control-based coping method that is 
commonly employed by clients prior to seeking treatment. Exploratory analyses suggest 
that depressive symptoms do not predict outcome variables at post-intervention or 
moderate the relation between the present interventions and these post-intervention 
outcomes. The defusion protocol was also found to effectively reduce the believability 
and emotional discomfort associated with negative self-referential thought among 
individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. In conclusion, the study suggests that, 
regardless of the levels of depressive symptom, the cognitive defusion technique is an 
effective strategy for altering the stimulus function of negative self-referential thought in 
a non-clinical sample. Given this encouraging finding, it may be worthwhile to 
investigate whether the present positive finding is generalized to a clinical sample with 
depression in future research.  
Further research is needed to clarify the difference between cognitive defusion 
and thought distraction strategies due to the lack of functional distinctions between the 
two active strategies. The present study revealed that although the effects of thought 
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distraction were smaller than those of the cognitive defusion condition, its effects on 
emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts appeared 
significant compared to the control condition. These findings were somewhat surprising 
because a distraction strategy and cognitive defusion technique were thought to be 
functionally different from each other.  
Several speculations can be drawn regarding the positive effects of thought 
distraction. One speculation is that so-called acceptance and mindfulness strategies, such 
as cognitive defusion, are not fundamentally different from control-based coping 
strategies, although its aims are said to be fundamentally unique (process- and function-
focused). As some experts in CBT (e.g., Hoffmann & Asmundson, 2008) suggest, the 
differences might be simply the matter of degree.  
Alternatively, the lack of the functional distinction was in part due to the nature of 
the negative self-referential thoughts. More specifically, the effects of the two strategies 
may be moderated by the severity of target private events. Literature on pain tolerance 
has shown that a distraction strategy is an effective coping strategy for mild or moderate 
pains, but not for severe ones (McCaul & Malott, 1984). A previous comparison 
experiment between an acceptance strategy and distraction strategy on pain tolerance 
revealed that both interventions were equally effective in a lower pain context, but that 
the superiority of an acceptance-based condition emerged in the context of greater pain 
intensity (Gutierrez et al., 2004). Given these previous findings, it was speculated that the 
lack of functional distinction between the two active conditions in the present study 
might have been in part because of negative self-referential thoughts that were not 
disturbing enough. In fact, integrity checks revealed that the majority of participants in 
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the thought distraction condition were able to perform the distraction strategy. This line 
of reasoning suggests that it is worthwhile to compare the two strategies, using a clinical 
sample, which is thought to experience more severely negative self-referential thoughts. 
It is also possible that the lack of a functional difference between defusion and 
distraction conditions can be attributed to the inadequacy of the believability measure. 
Using the believability measure, the current study attempted to capture the degree to 
which a thought is experienced as a mental event, regardless of the literal content of the 
thought (Hayes et al., 2006). However, it was extremely likely that participants viewed 
the believability measure as a scale of “how true or valid the content of the thought is.”  
One suggestion for future research is to change the anchor and verbal instruction of 
believability scale, from “how believable (true) is the thought?” to “how much do you 
experience the thought simply as a mental event, rather than as an absolute fact about 
you?” Another suggestion is to employ an alternative acceptance- and process-oriented 
measure, such as “how OK is it for you to have this thought?” in order to distinguish it 
from a content-based believability measure (i.e., veracity of thought). These alternative 
measures may be sensitive enough to capture the process of cognitive defusion.  
Another notable finding is that much greater variability (SDs) of discomfort and 
believability scores were seen at post-intervention than at pre-intervention across all 
intervention groups. These results clearly reveal that there were larger inter-individual 
differences at post-intervention, and suggest that the manipulations had varying effects 
across participants. It is speculated that the variability might have been due to pre-
intervention levels of discomfort and believability, participants’ coping repertoire for 
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difficult thoughts (e.g., coping strategies), demand characteristics, participants’ 
psychological characteristics, learning history, and other unknown factors.   
The present study has other conceptual and methodological limitations. The active 
conditions in the present study consisted of multiple components, and it is unclear which 
components or combination of components is responsible for changes in the stimulus 
function of the negative self-referential thoughts. However, given the results of  other 
focused studies (e.g., Masuda et al., 2009; McMullen et al., 2008; Takahashi, Muto, 
Tada, & Sugiyama, 2002), the experiential part of an acceptance exercise seems to be 
crucial in the functional change of private events. The present study also did not examine 
the impact of actual repetition of the target thought alone, although research on semantic 
satiation (Esposito & Pelton, 1971) suggests that word repetition without a rationale is 
unlikely to produce favorable effects. 
Similar to many focused experimental studies, follow-up assessments were not 
included in this investigation.  Although this can be considered a limitation, the long-term 
effects of this particular defusion technique may not be as important as showing that the 
process is useful in particular contexts. The purpose of defusion exercises is not to alter 
or defuse the meaning or function of target thoughts permanently. In fact, the meaning 
and function of a given thought is contextually determined and it is hoped that the client 
can maintain some level of contextual control over the meaning and function of all 
thoughts. Defusion exercises simply help the client experience that the emotional 
impact/meaning, with which negative self-referential thoughts typically accompany, is 
not absolute or inherent, and that a negative self-referential thought can be experienced as 
it is as a thought, rather than as what it says it is (Hayes et al., 1999). For this reason, the 
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effects of the present defusion exercise, and other defusion techniques, need not be long-
lasting, and yet they still provide clients with a new experience and thereby new learning. 
Methodologically, relative to the cognitive defusion condition, the thought 
distraction condition still had greater variability. During the intervention phase, the 
participants in the distraction condition were instructed to perform the distraction strategy 
by thinking about something different. While the participants received the identical 
instructions, the content of the private events used for the distraction strategy varied 
across participants. Although the manipulation check administered for the thought 
distraction condition suggested that the condition served its purpose, additional 
methodological control in the thought distraction strategy (i.e., pre-determining the 
stimulus used for distraction) seems warranted. It is also important to note that the verbal 
prompt used for the distraction condition during the actual exercise (i.e., “don’t think 
about it!”) appeared more closely related to a suppression strategy than a distraction 
method.    
Another less systematized area of the study was the use of multiple experimenters. 
Although a closely scripted intervention was employed and statistical analyses did not 
reveal a significant effect of experimenter, variations in the characteristics of 
experimenters, such as their interaction style with participants were highly likely. The 
audio-taped or video-taped recording of intervention sessions is recommended for 
adherence checks in future research.  
Furthermore, to minimize the variability in each intervention condition, the use of 
a computerized program may be useful as an alternative mode of experimental procedure 
for future research. The present investigation used a contact-based format in order to 
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maintain a therapeutic atmosphere in an analogue research setting. However, a more 
standardized procedure, such as the use of a computerized program or audio-taped 
intervention, may be important to systematically manipulate the variables of interests.    
Finally, perhaps the major limitation of the present study is the exclusive reliance 
on self-report measures. From an ACT perspective, discomfort and believability of 
private events are functional processes, and they should be studied within the context of 
ongoing stimulus-behavior relations. Self-report type methods do not measure these 
processes directly when they occur. It is difficult to directly assess the stimulus function 
of the negative self-referential thought, thus, the development of behavioral methodology 
that captures the function of self-referential thoughts seems extremely important.  
In sum, despite these limitations, the present investigation is the first study that 
shows the superior effects of the defusion procedure over a thought distraction strategy, a 
commonly used coping strategy by psychotherapy clients. The present findings are 
encouraging, and further investigations on the process and effects of a cognitive defusion 
approach seem warranted. 
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Table 1 
Average Scores, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Emotional Discomfort and 
Believability of Negative Self-Referential Thoughts by Condition and Time 
 
 Emotional Discomfort Believability 
 
Conditions: 









































       
Between Condition Cohen’s d       
     Condition 1 vs. Condition 2  -.54   -.74  
     Condition 1 vs. Condition 3  -1.13   -1.20  
     Condition 2 vs. Condition 3  -.51   -.45  
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Table 2 
Average Scores, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Emotional Discomfort and 
Believability of Negative Self-Referential Thoughts and Beck Depression Inventory-II  by 
Condition and Time among Participants with Elevated Depressive Symptom 
 
 Emotional Discomfort Believability BDI-II 
 
Conditions: 
Pre Post Pre-Post 
within d 
Pre Post Pre-Post 
within d  
1. Cognitive Defusion   












2. Thought Distraction 












3. Control  












        
Between Condition Cohen’s d        
     Cond. 1 vs. Cond. 2  -.30   -.65   
     Cond. 1 vs. Cond. 3  -.93   -.99   
     Cond. 2 vs. Cond. 3  -.47   -.22   
 
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; Cond. = Condition 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Means of emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential 
thoughts at pre and post by condition.
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